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RECENT DECISIONS
INCOME

TAX-LIQUIDATION OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONSSHAREHOLDERS IN A LIQUIDATING FOREIGN CORPORATION MUST INCLUDE IN THE CORPORATION'S EARNINGS AND PROFITS ACCOUNT THE
Am-OUNT OF RECAPTURED EXCESS DEPRECIATION REAIazED UPON THE
SALE OF ITS ASSETS

Plaintiffs, stockholders' in a "controlled foreign corporation,"2

brought suit for the refund of federal income taxes, challenging the
Government's assertion that depreciation recaptured on the sale of
assets in complete liquidation is includable in the liquidating corporation's earnings and profits account for the purpose of calculating "dividends" under § 1248(a). 3 In 1965 the corporation (Numar)
adopted a plan of complete liquidation and sold its assets,4 realiz-

ing a gain of $4,371,720. Within twelve months of the adoption of
the plan, Numar distributed the proceeds of the sale to its United
1. Plaintiffs, Richard T. and Margaret H. Brigham, were owners of more than
10% of the voting stock of Numar, S.A. (Numar), a corporation organized under
the laws of Costa Rica. They brought suit in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to recover $9,971 income tax paid for the
fiscal year ended December 31, 1966.
2. I.R.C. § 957(a) defines a controlled foreign corporation as "any foreign
corporation of which more than 50 percent of the total combined voting power of
all classes of stock entitled to vote is owned . . . by United States shareholders
on any day during the taxable year of such foreign corporation."
3. I.R.C. § 1248(a) provides in part:
(a) General Rule. -If(1) a United States person . . . receives a distribution from a foreign
corporation which, under section . . . 331, is treated as an exchange of
stock, and
(2) such person owns, within the meaning of section 958(a) . . .10
percent or more of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock
entitled to vote of such foreign corporation at any time during the 5-year
period ending on the date of the sale or exchange when such foreign corporation was a controlled foreign corporation (as defined in section 957), ...
Then the gain recognized on the sale or exchange of such stock shall be
included in the gross income of such person as a dividend, to the extent of
the earnings and profits of the foreign corporationattributable. . . to such
stock which were accumulated in taxable years of such foreign corporation
beginning after December 31, 1962, and during the period or periods the
stock sold or exchanged was held by such person while such foreign corporation was a controlled foreign corporation. (Emphasis added).
4. Numar sold all its assets, including some that had been excessively depreciated, to United Fruit Company.
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States shareholders, including plaintiffs. Plaintiffs conceded that
under § 1248(a) the liquidating distribution was taxable to them
as a dividend to the extent of Numar's earnings and profits attributable to their shares.5 Plaintiffs, however, on the authority of
§ 1248(d)(2), excluded from their computation of Numar's earnings and profits the entire amount of net gain realized upon the
sale of Numar's assets.' As a setoff defense, the Government
claimed that, notwithstanding the exclusion authorized by
§ 1248(d)(2), §§ 1245(a) and (d)7 required Numar to include in its
earnings and profits account $210,586 of gain attributable to recaptured depreciation realized upon the sale, just as if it had been a
domestic corporation liquidating under § 337(a).1 The district
court read § 1248(d) (2) literally, and held that all gain realized on
the sale of corporate assets should have been excluded from
Numar's earnings and profits account On appeal to the Third
See I.R.C. § 1248(a)(2), supra note 3.
I.R.C. § 1248(d)(2) provides in part:
For the purposes of this section, the following amounts shall be excluded,
with respect to any United States person, from the earnings and profits of
a foreign corporation:
(2) Gain realized from the sale or exchange of property in pursuance of
a plan of complete liquidation. . . and if section 337(a) would apply if such
foreign corporation were a domestic corporation, earnings and profits of the
foreign corporation attributable . . . to any net gain from the sale or exchange of property. (Emphasis added).
7. I.R.C. § 1245(a) requires taxpayers to recognize as ordinary income the
portion of any gain realized on the disposal of property during the taxable year
attributable to the recapture of depreciation deductions taken in prior years.
Subsection (d) provides that the section shall apply "notwithstanding any other
provisions of Subtitle A."
I.R.C. §§ 337(a), 1245 and 1248 are in Subtitle A. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1245-6(a)(b) (1972).
8. I.R.C. § 337(a) authorizes non-recognition of gain or loss from the sale or
exchange of property by a corporation that distributes its assets within twelve
months of the adoption of a plan of complete liquidation. Section 1245, however,
overrides § 337(a), and requires such corporation to recognize as ordinary income
any gain attributable to recaptured excess depreciation.
The parties to the instant action stipulated that, had Numar been a domestic
corporation, § 337(a) would have applied and permitted it to exclude from its
taxable income the full amount of gain realized on the sale of its assets, less
$210,586 of depreciation recapture.
For discussions of the application of § 337(a) to varying fact patterns, see
generally Note, Tax-Free Sales in Liquidation Under Section 337, 76 HARv. L.
REV. 780 (1963); Rock, Corporate Liquidations Under Section 337, TAX MNGM'T
(BNA) Portfolio No. 18-5th (1975).
9. Brigham v. United States, 396 F. Supp. 823 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
5.
6.
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Circuit Court of Appeals, held, reversed. Since § 1245 overrides the
§ 1248(d) (2) net gain exclusion, for the purpose of § 1248(a), shareholders in a liquidating foreign corporation must include in the
corporation's earnings and profits account the amount of gain realized upon the sale of excessively depreciated property attributable
to recaptured depreciation deductions taken in prior years.
Brigham v. United States, 539 F.2d 1312 (3d Cir. 1976).
In 1924 Congress enacted § 331(a)(1), which permits shareholders to treat a distribution in complete liquidation of a corporation
as "in full payment in exchange for the stock."" ° Therefore, if the
stock of the liquidating corporation is a capital asset in the hands
of the shareholder, any gain realized on the distribution is ordinarily reported as capital gain." Since the size of each shareholder's
pro rata distribution varies inversely with the amount of income
tax paid by the liquidating corporation on gain realized upon the
sale of its appreciated assets, taxpayer-shareholders sought to
maximize the favorable tax treatment afforded by § 331 by attempting to characterize the transaction as a sale by the shareholders of property immediately after its receipt in complete liquidation, rather than as a sale by the corporation followed by a pro
rata distribution to the shareholders,12 thereby avoiding double
10. Under prior law, liquidating distributions were taxed as a dividend. The
change was made to simplify administration of the taxation of such distributions.
See S. REP. No. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1939-1 (Part 2) C.B. 266,
274.
The analogy between liquidation of a corporation and a sale of its shares by the
taxpayer is not perfect. When a shareholder sells shares that are a capital asset
within the meaning of § 1221, he realizes capital gain to the extent that the
amount realized exceeds his adjusted basis. I.R.C. § 1001. The corporate earnings
and profits account, however, remains intact, and is distributed to new shareholders as dividends and taxed as ordinary income. I.R.C. § 61(a)(7). On the other
hand, if the same corporation is liquidated, the earnings and profits account is
wiped clean, and escapes taxation as ordinary income entirely. There is no taxation of earnings and profits beyond a shareholder's recognition of capital gain or
loss. I.R.C. § 331(a). See B. BrrrKER & J. EUSTmCE, FEDERAL INcohim TAXATION OF
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 11-3 (3d ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as BIrrKER
& EusTIcE].
11. For a discussion of the computation and taxation of capital gain and loss,
see generally J. CHOMMIE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 324-439 (2d ed. 1973).
12. Prior to the passage of the Revenue Act of 1954, these two different methods of distributing corporate assets to shareholders had disparate tax consequences:
(1) If a corporation sold its appreciated assets and then distributed the proceeds to its shareholders, any gain realized on the sale would be taxed first to the
corporation (usually as long term capital gain, I.R.C. § 1231), and then to the
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taxation of the appreciated value of corporate property. 3 Disputes
arose over the nature of such transactions, and the courts had
difficulty determining when the sale fell in one category or the
other. The uncertainty 4 created by the holding of the Supreme
Court in Commissioner v. Court Holding Co.,15 that whether such
properties were sold by the shareholders or by the liquidating corporation was a question of fact to be decided on the circumstances
in each case,"6 was resolved *by the enactment of § 337(a). That
section provides for non-recognition of gain realized by a corporation upon the sale or exchange of appreciated assets when the
proceeds are distributed within twelve months of adoption of a
plan of complete liquidation.' 7 Congress limited the nonshareholder upon receipt of the distribution (again usually as long term capital
gain, I.R.C. § 331(a)(1)).
(2) If the shareholders liquidated the corporation, however, and took title to
the appreciated assets, the corporation would have recognized no income on the
transaction. I.R.C. § 336. The corporation's accumulated earnings would have
been taxed only once, as capital gain to shareholders on the receipt of the property. I.R.C. § 331(a)(1). Furthermore, the new basis of the appreciated property
received would have been its fair market value at the time of the transfer. I.R.C.
§ 334(a). Therefore, if such property was sold immediately at fair market value,
there would have been no gain, and consequently, no additional tax.
13. For an illustration of the magnitude of the tax saving that could have
resulted under the latter characterization of the transaction, see BrrrZER &
EUSTICE, supra note 10, at 11-53.
14. Judicial emphasis on the form of the transaction as determinative of its
tax consequences in Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., and United States v.
Cumberland Pub. Serv. Co., discussed note 16 infra, had created a "trap for the
unwary." H.R. REP. No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 49 (1954).
15. 324 U.S. 331 (1945).
16. All of the outstanding stock of Court Holding Co., which was organized
for the sole purpose of purchasing and holding a single apartment house, was
owned by Miller and his wife. They negotiated a sale of the apartment house, but
attempted to avoid income tax to the corporation by declaring a "liquidating
dividend," which involved deeding the building to the Millers and a return of all
outstanding stock. They subsequently executed a contract of sale, which embodied substantially the same terms previously agreed upon. The Supreme Court
affirmed the Tax Court's imputation of income to the corporation, observing
that, "[tihe incidence of taxation depends upon the substance of the transaction
. . . which. . . must be viewed as a whole, and each step, from the commencement of negotiations to the consummation of the sale, is relevant." 324 U.S. at
334.
The opposite result was reached in United States v. Cumberland Pub. Serv.
Co., 338 U.S. 451 (1950), where the Court contrasted the Tax Court's finding that
Court Holding Co. never dissolved with the Court of Claims' finding of a
"genuine" liquidation of Cumberland Pub. Serv. Co. and a valid sale by its
shareholders.
17. See note 8 supra.
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recognition provision of § 337(a) in § 1245, which overrides all
other provisions of Subtitle A,"8 and which requires the recognition
as ordinary income of any gain realized upon the sale or exchange
of certain depreciable property to the extent of depreciation allowed after 1961.' 9 Prior to the enactment of § 1248 in 1962,0 an
investor in a foreign corporation enjoyed additional tax advantages
to those available to an investor in a domestic corporation., A
United States taxpayer was able to invest in a controlling share of
a foreign corporation, which would pay a small foreign corporate

income tax on its accumulated earnings while withholding distri-

bution of taxable dividends. 2" On complete liquidation, the repatriated accumulated earnings would ordinarily be reported by a
shareholder as capital gain.2 Tax savings would generally accrue
to the extent that United States corporate income tax rates exceeded those of the country in which the liquidating corporation
was located. 24 Section 1248 was enacted to discourage such transac18. I.R.C. § 1245(d).
19. See note 7 supra.
The general rule provides that ordinary income is to be recognized in the
case of sales or exchanges to the extent the so-called recomputed basis, or
amount realized in the sale or exchange, whichever is lesser, exceeds the
basis of the property in the hands of the person making the sale or exchange.
H.R. REP. No. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 472 (1962).
20. For the text of § 1248(a), enacted in the Revenue Act of 1962, see note 3
supra.
21. The following hypothetical transaction illustrates the tax advantages realized by investors in domestic corporations under pre-1962 law: (1) Shareholder
invested in a domestic corporation; his basis was the purchase price of the shares.
I.R.C. § 1012. (2) The corporation accumulated profits by foregoing dividends
taxable to shareholder as ordinary income, on which it paid corporate income tax.
No tax was paid on the mere appreciation of corporate property. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920). (3) No gain was recognized by the corporation on
the sale of its appreciated assets in complete liquidation. I.R.C. § 337(a). (4) On
distribution, the shareholder's gain, the amount by which the amount realized
(which included the accumulated profits and any gain from the sale of appreciated assets) exceeded his basis, (I.R.C. § 1001), was ordinarily reported as
capital gain. I.R.C. § 331(a).
22. The United States has no direct taxing jurisdiction over foreign source
income of foreign corporations which is not "effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business in the United States." I.R.C. §§ 332(a), 864, 881.
23. I.R.C. § 331(a).
24. Prior to the enactment of I.R.C. § 1248, the tax burden to a U.S. shareholder on income earned abroad was usually the sum of (1) the foreign corporate
income tax, and (2) U.S. capital gains tax. The tax savings to a U.S. shareholder
could have been considerable, unless the effective foreign tax rate was relatively
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tions by equalizing the tax treatment of investors in domestic and
foreign corporations.2 5 This was accomplished by requiring the
principal United States shareholders 8 of a controlled foreign corporation" to report their pro rata share of earnings and profits
accumulated after 1962 as a dividend when the corporation is liquidated."8 Calculation of earnings and profits of the liquidating foreign corporation is to be by a method "substantially similar" 9 to
rules applicable to domestic corporations, with several excep-

tions."9 The most pertinent of these rules is the exclusion from
earnings and profits of any amount, "if § 337(a) would apply if
such foreign corporation were a domestic corporation, . . . attributable to any net gain from the sale or exchange of property. ' 31 The
high, and the availability of the foreign tax credit (I.R.C. §§ 901-905) made
repatriation of earnings as dividends more advantageous. See Gifford, Controlled
Corporations-Section1248, TAx MNGM'T (BNA) Portfolio No. 240 (1975).
25. See H.R. REP. No. 1447, supra note 19, reprinted in 1962-3 C.B. 461-62,
480-82; S. REP. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. reprintedin 1962-3 C.B. 707, 81315. The Senate report states:
The bill has as one of its objectives in the foreign income area the imposition
of the full U.S. tax when income earned abroad is repatriated. Full U.S.
taxation will occur in the case of the ordinary taxable liquidations or sales
or exchanges only if the earnings and profits are in effect taxed as dividends
(to the extent of any gain) at the time the funds are brought back to the
United States. This objective is accomplished by this section of the bill.
1962-3 C.B. at 813.
26. Section 1248(a)(2) requires United States persons owning 10% or more of
the total combined voting power of all classes of stock to comply with the section.
See note 3 supra.
27. See note 2 supra.
28. The "dividend" reported pursuant to I.R.C. § 1248(a) is taxed to the U.S.
shareholder as is provided in I.R.C. § 1248(b). The purpose of subsection (b) is
to tax § 1248 dividends in a manner that takes into account the difference in the
amount of ordinary corporate income tax paid indireclty by U.S. shareholders of
domestic corporations and the foreign corporate income tax paid by foreign corporations, thereby equalizing tax treatment of the two classes of shareholders. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.1248-4 (1972). See also S. REP. No. 1881, supra note 25, reprinted
in 1962-3 C.B. 707, 815.
29. I.R.C. § 1248(c).
30. Section 1248 excludes from the earnings and profits of the controlled foreign corporation:
(1) Pre-1963 earnings and profits (I.R.C. § 1248(a))
(2) Earnings and profits of certain less developed country corporations
(I.R.C. § 1248(d)(3)) and
(3) Certain earnings and profits already taxed at the U.S. rate (I.R.C. §§
1248(d)(1), (4), (5)).
31. I.R.C. § 1248(d)(2). In the Senate report accompanying the Revenue Act
of 1962, the Senate Committee on Finance stated:
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literal language of the statute suggests that when computing earnings and profits for the purposes of § 1248(a), § 1248(d)(2) operates
to exclude recaptured depreciation, notwithstanding § 1245(d). It
is well established that an unambiguous statute must be construed
literally and given effect according to its language,3 2 a rule that is
applied with particular strictness in the case of a taxing act.3 Even
where a statute is found to be ambiguous, there is a prima facie
presumption that congressional intent is embodied in the words of
a statute," and in the absence of evidence to the contrary, should
be literally construed. Arguably, therefore, § 1248 is not ambiguous, and after it is determined that § 337(a) would have applied
to a liquidating foreign corporation had it been a domestic corporation, the inquiry is ended. Thereafter, the entire amount of gain
realized on the sale of appreciated assets is excluded from earnings
and profits for the purposes of § 1248(a), notwithstanding that
§ 337(a) would not have shielded a domestic corporation from
recognition of recaptured depreciation under § 1245. The Supreme
Court, however, has indicated that the manifest intent of the legislature may prevail over the literal words of a statute.36 In
The earnings and profits for the purpose of this section do not include any
amount attributable to gains on sales made in the course of a liquidation if
these sales would have been treated as tax-free sales on liquidation (under
section 337(a)) had the foreign corporation been a domestic corporation.
(Emphasis added).
S. REP. No. 1881, supra note 25, reprintedin 1962-3 C.B. 815. See also Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1248-1(d)(ii)(1964), which provides:
If a foreign corporation adopts a plan of complete liquidation in a taxable
year of the corporation beginning after December 31, 1962, and if because
of the applicationof section 337(a) gain or loss would not be recognized by
the corporationfrom the sale or exchange of propertyif the corporationwere
a domestic corporation, then the earnings and profits of the corporation
accumulated for the taxable year (computed without any reduction for
distributions) shall be determined without regard to the amount of such
gain or loss. See section 1248(d)(2). (Emphasis added).
32. Helvering v. N.Y. Trust Co., 292 U.S. 455 (1934); Commissioner of Immigration v. Gottlieb, 265 U.S. 310 (1924).
33. Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55 (1930).
34. Id. In that case the Court stated that "a construction adopted in harmony
with what is thought to be the spirit and purpose of the act in order to give effect
to the intent of Congress . . . [should be] applied to override the literal terms
of a statute only under rare and exceptional circumstances." 282 U.S. at 59-60.
35. United States v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 385 (1867); Detroit Citizens'
St. R. Co. v. Detroit, 64 F. 628 (6th Cir. 1894).
36. See, e.g., Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642 (1974), where the Court,
construing the Consumer Credit Protection Act in light of the provisions of the
Bankruptcy Act, stated:
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Pielemeier v. United States,3" the court rejected a literal construction of § 1248, holding that § 1245 overrides § 1248(d)(2), and has
the effect of increasing the earnings and profits of the foreign corporation by the amount of the recaptured depreciation. The opposite result was reached under identical facts by the lower court in
the instant case. 8 Although the district court recognized that
§ 1245(a) limits the benefits confered by § 337(a), it ruled that
those sections deal with recognition of gain to the corporation, and
not with computation of earnings and profits. 9 Consequently,
§ 1245(a) was found not to negate or limit the "unambiguous language"4 of subsection (d)(2). These two conflicting interpretations
of § 1248(d)(2) constituted the only judicial precedent for the instant decision.
In the instant decision, 4 the court analyzed § 1248(d)(2) to determine the sole issue: whether that section permitted the exclusion from Numar's earnings and profits of the $210,586 gain that
would have been taxable to a domestic corporation "notwithstanding" the non-recognition provision of § 337(a). The
court conceded that plaintiffs' argument that the phrase "any net
gain" in § 1248(d)(2)42 refers to the entire amount of any gain
[Wihen "interpreting a statute, the court will not look merely to a particular clause in which general words may be used, but it will take in connection
with it the whole statute (or statutes on the same subject) and the objects
and policy of the law, as indicated by its various provisions, and give it such
a construction as will carry into execution the will of the legislature ..
Brown v. Duchesne, 19 How. 183 (1857).
417 U.S. at 650. See, United States v. Skelly Oil Co., 394 U.S. 678 (1969) LMinnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 311 (1965);
United States v. Zacks, 375 U.S. 59 (1963); Richards v. United States, 369 U.S.
1 (1962). See also Helvering v. Hammel, 311 U.S. 504 (1941), where the Court
stated:
courts in the interpretation of a statute have some scope for adopting a
restricted rather than a literal or usual meaning of its words where acceptance of that meaning ... would thwart the obvious purpose of the statute
.... But courts are not free to reject that meaning where

. . .

it appears

to be consonant with the purposes of the Act as declared by Congress and
plainly disclosed by its structure.
311 U.S. at 510-11.
37. 74-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 9,599 (C.D. Cal. 1974), aff'd 543 F.2d 81 (9th Cir.
1976).
38. Brigham v. United States, 396 F. Supp. 823 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
39. 396 F. Supp. at 825.

40. Id.
41. The instant court initially recited the stipulated facts. See text accompanying notes 1-10 supra.
42. 539 F.2d at 1314-15.
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realized by a liquidating corporation, derives some support from
the literal language of the statute,4 3 regardless that a portion of the
gain, notwithstanding § 337(a), would have been taxable to a domestic corporation under § 1245. The court, however, believed
plaintiffs' interpretation 44 would produce the sort of inequity
§ 1248 as a whole was enacted to correct, since by avoiding dividend treatment of the $210,586 gain under §§ 1248(a) and (b),
taxpayers would escape paying their pro rata share of the corporate
tax they would have borne indirectly had Numar been a domestic
corporation.4 5 An examination of the legislative history of
§ 1248(d)(2), moreover, convinced the court that Congress specifically intended that section to produce the same tax consequences
to shareholders of liquidating foreign corporations under § 1248(a)
as those liquidating under § 337(a).41 Consequently, the court reversed, holding that the amount of gain realized on the sale of
appreciated assets attributable to recaptured depreciation was
properly included in the liquidating foreign corporation's earnings
and profits account for the purposes of § 1248.
The instant result effectuates congressional intent, which is
manifested clearly in the legislative history" and implicit in the
overall scheme of § 1248,48 to equalize the tax treatment of United
States shareholders in domestic and foreign liquidating corporations. The drafting technique utilized in § 1248(d)(2) makes it
clear that the purpose of that subsection was to carry over the
policy judgment made by Congress to resolve the Court Holding
Company dispute through the passage of § 337 into the taxation
of foreign corporate liquidations. It is logical and consistent with
the overall scheme of § 1248 that § 1248(d)(2) and § 337(a) be
construed to operate in a parallel manner to produce similar tax
consequences to United States shareholders in domestic and foreign corporations, regardless of the corporation's domicile. This
will be the case only if § 1245 operates as an exception to the
§ 1248(d)(2) net gain exception. The district court's expansive interpretation of subsection (d) (2) impermissibly broadened the nar43. Id. at 1316.
44. For an alternative statement of plaintiffs' argument, see text accompanying notes 35-36 supra.
45. 539 F.2d at 1317.
46. The court quoted the portion of Senate Report No. 1881 emphasized in
note 31 supra.
47. See S. REP. No. 1881, supra note 25.
48. See note 28 supra.
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row purpose for which it was enacted, and was contrary to the
legislative intent because that construction conferred on a shareholder in a foreign corporation a tax benefit not enjoyed by shareholders in domestic corporations. The lower court's ruling, if permitted to stand, would have supported an argument that sales of
inventory items by a foreign corporation during the year of liquidation could be excluded from earnings and profits,4 9 which would
further defeat the overall purpose of § 1248. For these reasons, the
district court was properly reversed. The instant court's abbreviated analysis of the threshold issues of statutory construction,
however, clouded the nature of its conflict with the lower court.
found the language of subsection (d)(2) to be
The district court
"unambiguous,"5 0 construed the words of the statute literally, and
refused to consider evidence of a contrary legislative intent. The
instant court implicitly reversed the lower court on this question
to avoid the rule against non-literal construction of an unambiguous taxing statute.5 1 The instant court then implicitly decided
that evidence of legislative intent was strong enough to overcome
the prima facie presumption" in favor of the literal language of
§ 1248(d) (2). A clearer exposition of this analytical method would
have produced the same result and eliminated the appearance of
a non-literal construction of an unambiguous taxing statute. In
any case, the instant decision has apparently settled the issue of
the effect of § 1245 recapture on a liquidating foreign corporation's
earnings and profits account,53 and has eliminated the need for
clarification of congressional intent by an amendment to § 1248.
William W. Allen
49. See I RHOADES, INCOME TAXATION OF FOREIGN RELATED TRANSACTIONS §
3.06, at 3-164 (1976).
50. 396 F. Supp. at 825.
51. See note 33 supra, and accompanying text.
52. See note 34 supra, and accompanying text.
53. In Pielemeier v. United States, 543 F.2d 81 (9th Cir. 1976) aff'g 74-2 U.S.
Tax Cas. 9,599 (C.D. Cal. 1974), the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
when presented with the same issue under identical facts, cited the instant decision, and affirmed the lower court without further discussion.

CUSTOMS DUTIES-ANTIDUMPING ACT OF 1921-THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY HAS No AUTHORITY TO TERMINATE A WITHHOLDING OF APPRAISEMENT PRIOR TO THE PUBLICATION OF A DUMPING
FINDING BASED ON A LIKELIHOOD OF INJURY DETERMINATION BY THE
INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION

On October 31, 1973, plaintiff, Timken Company, submitted to
the Secretary of the Treasury a complaint that Japanese tapered

roller bearings were being, or were likely to be, imported into the
United States under circumstances justifying the imposition of
dumping duties under the Antidumping Act of 1921.2 After investigating, the Treasury Department published a notice on June 5,
1974, stating that there was reason to believe or suspect that

dumping was occurring and ordered customs officials to withhold
appraisement 3 of tapered roller bearings from Japan. On September 6, 1974, the Treasury Department published a determination
that these items were being, or were likely to be, sold at less than
fair value (LTFV) and so advised the International Trade Commission (Commission). On January 23, 1975, the Commission determined that "an industry in the United States is likely to be injured" by the importation of these items at LTFV. Instead of publishing a dumping finding 4 immediately thereafter, the Secretary
directed customs officials to appraise all Japanese tapered roller
bearings covered by the withholding notice.5 Since dumping duties
are applicable only to unappraised merchandise,' these entries
were no longer subject to potential imposition of such duties.
Timken then filed a complaint against the Secretary in the District
Court for the District of Columbia seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. Timken contended that the Secretary had no statutory
authority to order this appraisement prior to the publication of a
dumping finding. The district court entered a permanent injunction requiring the Secretary to publish a dumping finding immedi1. The term "dumping" refers to international price discrimination-the
practice of selling goods in foreign markets at prices lower than in the home
market.
2. 19 U.S.C. § 160 et seq. (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
3. "Appraisement" means the ascertainment or determination of value of
imported merchandise. Timken Co. v. Simon, 539 F.2d 221, 224 n.2 (D.C. Cir.
1976).
4. For an explanation of the term "dumping finding," see notes 18 & 19 infra,
and accompanying text.
5. For an explanation of the term "withholding notice," see page 156 infra.
6. 19 U.S.C. § 161(a) (1970).
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ately and to withhold appraisement of the roller bearings until
after publication. On appeal,7 the Government argued that the
Secretary is authorized by 19 U.S.C. § 160(b)(1)(B) to terminate
a withholding of appraisement prior to the publication of a dumping finding when the Commission determines that a United States
industry is only "likely to be injured" by the LTFV sales? Timken
maintained that the "until further order of the Secretary" clause
of the statute authorized the Secretary to terminate a withholding
notice prior to the publication of a dumping finding only when he
is unable to publish such a finding."0 The Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, held, affirmed. The Secretary of the
Treasury has no authority under the Antidumping Act to order the
appraisement of goods covered by a withholding notice prior to the
publication of a dumping finding based on a likelihood of injury
determination by the International Trade Commission. Timken
Co. v. Simon, 539 F.2d 221 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
7. The Circuit Court stayed, pending appeal, that portion of the District
Court order requiring the Secretary to publish a dumping finding immediately.
539 F.2d at 225 n.5.
8. 19 U.S.C. § 160(b)(1)(B) (Supp. V 1975) provides that a withholding of
appraisement is to remain in force "until the further order of the Secretary, or
until the Secretary has made public a [dumping] finding. .. ."
9. The Government also argued that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to
enter the challenged order because the Customs Court has exclusive jurisdiction
over the subject matter of Timken's complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1582(b) (1970) states
that: "The Customs Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil action brought
by American manufacturers, producers, or wholesalers pursuant to section 516 of
the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended." The Government argued further that jurisdiction was lacking because there is an implied statutory preclusion of judicial
review of customs-related matters other than those matters reviewable in the
Customs Court under section 516 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1516(a)
(Supp. V 1975). The Court of Appeals rejected both of these arguments and
sustained the District Court's jurisdiction. The court held that this case was not
a civil action brought pursuant to section 516 of the Tariff Act of 1930 and
therefore did not fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Customs Court as
defined in 28 U.S.C. § 1582(b). The court also held that since there is no persuasive evidence of any implied statutory preclusion of judicial review of customsrelated matters other than those reviewable in the Customs Court, the powerful
presumption of reviewability should prevail.
10. This could occur because the Secretary has reached a negative LTFV
determination and therefore has not referred the complaint to the Commission,
or because the Commission has concluded that the relevant U.S. industries are
not subject to actual or probable injury. See notes 16 & 17 infra, and accompanying text.
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The Antidumping Act of 192111 was enacted to prevent actual or
threatened injury to a domestic market resulting from the sale of
merchandise in the United States at prices lower than those in the
country of origin. 12 The Act seeks to accomplish this by imposing
a special dumping duty 3 when it is determined that such price
discrimination injures, or is likely to injure an American industry. 4
Responsibility for the administration of the Antidumping Act is
divided between the Treasury Department and the International
Trade Commission. According to the established procedure, the
Secretary of the Treasury, upon receiving a complaint that goods
are being dumped, must determine whether that class of foreign
merchandise "is being, or is likely to be, sold in the United States
or elsewhere at less than its fair value.' 5 Fair value is generally
considered to be the price in the country of origin.'" If the Secretary's determination is in the affirmative, he must advise the International Trade Commission, which then must notify him within
three months whether an industry in the United States "is being
or is likely to be injured, or is prevented from being established"
by the LTFV sales.' 7 If the Commission also reaches an affirmative
determination, the Secretary must publish a notice of both determinations.'8 Once this notice, known as a "dumping finding," has
11. 19 U.S.C. § 160 et seq. (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
12. J.C. Penney Co. v. Department of the Treasury, 319 F. Supp. 1023, 1024
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 439 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869
(1971). For general discussion of the dumping problem and the United States
legislative response, see Baier, SubstantiveInterpretationsUnder the Antidumping Act and the Foreign Trade Policy of the United States, 17 STAN. L. Rnv. 409
(1965); Barcelo, Antidumping Laws as Barriersto Trade-The United States and
the InternationalAntidumping Code, 57 CORNELL L. Rv. 491 (1972); Coudert,
The Application of the United States Antidumping Law in the Light of a Liberal
Trade Policy, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 189 (1965); Fisher, The Antidumping Law of the
United States: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 5 L. &POL'Y INT'L Bus. 85 (1973);
Kohn, The Antidumping Act: Its Administration and Place in American Trade
Policy, 60 MICH. L. Rv.407 (1962); Weeks, Introduction to the Antidumping
Law: A Form of Protectionfor the American Manufacturer, 35 ALBANY L. REv.
182 (1971); Note, The Antidumping Act: Problems of Administrationand Proposals for Change, 17 STAN. L. Rnv. 731 (1965).
13. 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-161 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). The amount of the duty is
approximately equal to the excess of the price in foreign markets over the price
in the United States.
14. Id.
15. Id. § 160(a).
16. Id. § 161(a).
17. Id. § 160(a).
18. Id.
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been published, all imported, unappraised merchandise described
in that finding, and entered or withdrawn from its warehouse not
more than 120 days before the complaint was presented to the
Secretary, is subject to the special dumping duty.19 To prevent
goods imported during the pendency of the dumping complaint
from being appraised by customs officials and thus escaping subsequent imposition of dumping duties, Congress enacted a provisional measure known as "withholding of appraisement." Under 19
U.S.C. § 160(b)(1) (B), whenever the Secretary of the Treasury has
reason to suspect that a class or kind of merchandise is being
dumped, he must publish notice of that fact, called a "withholding
notice," in the Federal Register and must order customs officials
to withhold appraisement of such merchandise. This merchandise
can be appraised and released by customs officials only if a bond
is filed to assure payment of any dumping duties subsequently
assessed or if the withholding of appraisement order is terminated." The statute provides that the withholding of appraisement
is to continue "until the further order of the Secretary" or until a
2
dumping finding is publishedY.
The precise scope of the Secretary's authority to terminate withholding of appraisement orders
under the "until further order of the Secretary" clause had never
been judicially determined. Until 1972, however, the Secretary
only terminated withholding notices after the publication of the
dumping finding or when no dumping finding was to be published.
Thus, dumping duties were retroactively assessed on entries covered by the withholding notice even in cases where the dumping
finding was based on a likelihood of injury determination by the
Tariff Commission." Foreign objections to this retroactive assessment of dumping duties and other procedures under the Antidumping Act led to the negotiation of the International AntiDumping Code of 19671 to which the United States became a party
19. Id. § 161(a).
20. 19 U.S.C. § 167 (1970); 19 C.F.R. §§ 153.50-.51 (1976).
21. 19 U.S.C. § 160(b)(1)(B) (Supp. V 1975).
22. See, e.g., Portland Cement from the Dominican Republic, Treas. Dec.
55883 (1963), Steel Jacks from Canada, Treas. Dec. 66-191 (1966). Until 1974
injury determinations were made by the United States Tariff Commission. The
Tariff Commission was renamed the International Trade Commission by the
Trade Act of 1974, P.L. No. 93-618, § 171, 88 Stat. 2009 (1975).
23. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature, June 30, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 4348, T.I.A.S.
No. 6431 (effective July 1, 1968), reprintedin 6 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 920 (1969)
and 32 Fed. Reg. 14962 (1967) [hereinafter cited as International Antidumping
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by executive agreement. 2 Article 11 of the Code prohibits the retroactive assessment of dumping duties except in cases where "a
determination of material injury (but not a threat of material injury. . .) is made." Although the United States is under a binding
international obligation to implement the Code,2- as a non-selfexecuting agreement2" it can have no binding effect in the United
States unless it is actually implemented. 27 The Congress has, howCode]. The International Antidumping Code was one product of the Sixth Round
of Trade Negotiations (known as the Kennedy Round) under the auspices of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), done, October 30, 1947, 61
Stat. Parts 5-6 (1974), T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. The Code was formally
negotiated as an agreement to elaborate the provisions of GATT, art. IV, which
covers countervailing and antidumping duties.
For discussion of the negotiation and effect of the International Anti-Dumping
Code, see Anthony, The American Response to Dumping From Capitalist and
Socialist Economies-Substantive Premises, and RestructuredProceduresAfter
the 1967 GATT Code, 54 CORNELL L. REv. 159 (1969); Barcelo, supra note 12;
Pintos & Murphy, Commentary/CongressDumps the InternationalAntidumping
Code, 18 CATH. U.L. REv. 180 (1968); Shannon & Marx, The InternationalAntiDumping Code and United States Antidumping Law-An Appraisal, 7 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 171 (1968).
24. Ambassador Michael Blumenthal signed the International Anti-Dumping
Code for the United States in Geneva, Switzerland, on June 30, 1967. See Shannon & Marx, supra note 23, at 173 n.14.
25.

See,

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw

§ 138 (1965).

26. International agreements may be non-self-executing because of a constitutional requirement, the generality of the agreement's provisions, or because those
provisions indicate that implementing legislation of some kind is contemplated.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 141-145 (1965). The
International Anti-Dumping Code is non-self-executing by its own terms since it
requires signatories to bring their laws and regulations into conformity. Article
14 of the Code requires that each party to the Agreement:
take all necessary steps, of a general or particular character, to ensure, not
later than the date of the entry into force of the Agreement for it, the
conformity of its laws, regulations, and administrative procedures with the
provisions of the Anti-Dumping Code.
International Anti-Dumping Code, art. 14, supra note 23, 6 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS at 930.
27. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 141-145 (1965).
The Executive hoped to implement the Code through the administrative decisions of the Treasury Department and the Tariff Commission.
The Executive might have sought implementation by other means.
"Congressional legislation, the most common means, would have established the
superiority of the Code over the Act, but this alternative was unpromising because
of strong protectionist sentiment in Congress. The executive branch might have
argued plausibly that the Code was based on the power delegated to the President
in the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, which authorized participation in the Kennedy Round. Implementation could then have been achieved through the Presi-
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ever, severely limited the extent to which the Code might be implemented by enacting the Renegotiation Amendments Act of 1968,28
which instructs the Treasury Department and the Tariff Commission (now the International Trade Commission) to give effect to
the Code only insofar as it is not inconsistent with the Antidumping Act. The determination of the scope of the Secretary's
authority, therefore, still depends upon an interpretation of the
Antidumping Act. In 1972 the Secretary departed from the practice of terminating withholding notices only after the publication
of the dumping finding or where no dumping finding was to be
published, and began terminating withholding notices prior to the
publication of dumping findings based on a likelihood of injury
determination by the International Trade Commission. 29 This
brought the Government's practice into conformity with article 11
of the International Anti-Dumping Code. The Government's conclusion that 19 U.S.C. § 160(b)(1)(B) authorized this newer practice rested on the premise that when the International Trade Commission determines that a United States industry is "likely to be
injured" by the LTFV sales it is actually saying that although
there is no present injury, future LTFV sales occurring after the
Secretary publishes the dumping finding will cause injury." This
premise was supported to some extent by City Lumber Co. v.
dent's special proclamation power authorized in that Act. But the delegating
language in the 1962 Act was weak; it merely authorized reduction of 'existing
duty or other import restriction.' Moreover, a number of Congressmen argued
strongly that there was no authority for the Code in the 1962 Act." Barcelo, supra
note 12, at 533.
28. Renegotiation Amendments Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-634, § 201(a), 82
Stat. 1347 (1968), which provides:
Nothing contained in the International Antidumping Code, signed at
Geneva on June 30, 1967, shall be construed to restrict the discretion of the
United States Tariff Commission in performing its duties and functions
under the Antidumping Act, 1921, and in performing their duties and functions under such Act the Secretary of the Treasury and the Tariff Commission shall -

(1) resolve any conflict between the International Antidumping Code
and the Antidumping Act, 1921, in favor of the Act as applied by the agency
administering the Act, and
(2) take into account the provisions of the International Antidumping
Code only insofar as they are consistent with the Antidumping Act, 1921,
as applied by the agency administering the Act.
29. 539 F.2d at 228. It is not clear from the court's opinion why it concluded
that 1972 was the year in which the Secretary departed from the previous practice.
30. Id. at 229.

Winter 19771

RECENT DECISIONS

United States,31 in which the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals held it proper for the Tariff Commission to take into consideration the intent of the importer in reaching an injury determination, because "the statute refers not only to injury but also to
likelihood of injury which clearly evisages future events and the
'32
probability of their occurrence according to someone's intent.
(Emphasis added.) Relying on this premise, the Government concluded that the "until further order of the Secretary" clause must
authorize the termination of a withholding notice prior to the publication of a dumping finding based on a likelihood of injury determination. The Government reasoned that in such a case the continued withholding of appraisement and the resulting retroactive
assessment of dumping duties would be improper since goods entered prior to the publication of the dumping finding would not
33
have been determined to have caused injury.
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals rejected the Government's new interpretation of 19 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1)(B), noting several flaws in the Government's analysis of the antidumping regulatory scheme. The court first observed that the Government's premise regarding the meaning of a likelihood of injury determination
by the Commission was unfounded and unrealistic. The court
noted that a review of Commission injury determinations indicated that even the Commission itself did not take the present
injury-future injury approach suggested by the Government. The
court ruled that a likelihood determination was not a statement
that future injury will occur, but rather a way of saying that,
although the Commission cannot conclude with certainty that injury is occurring, it can, nevertheless, conclude that there is such
a high risk of injury that antidumping duties should be assessed.
Secondly, the court noted that the Government's interpretation
would have, as it did in the instant case, the absurd result of
immunizing entries covered by the withholding notice from regulatory review since the entries at issue here entered after the case was
referred to the Commission but before the Secretary could ever
publish a dumping finding. There was no way the Commission
could make either a present injury or a likelihood of injury determination with respect to these goods. Thirdly, the court observed
that it was impossible to reconcile the Government's more recent
31. 457 F.2d 991 (C.C.P.A. 1972).
32. Id. at 997.
33. 539 F.2d at 229-30.
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interpretation of the statutory language with its prior willingness
to assess dumping duties retroactively even in cases where the
Commission had reached only a likelihood of injury determination.
Finally, the court pointed out that perhaps the most crucial flaw
in the Government's argument was its failure to show any legislative history supporting a denial of retroactive assessment of duties
based solely on the fact that the Commission reached a likelihood
of injury determination. The court concluded that the "until further order of the Secretary" clause should be interpreted according
to its plain meaning, and therefore did not authorize the Secretary
to terminate a withholding of appraisement notice prior to the
publication of a dumping finding even when the International
Trade Commission determines that injury is only likely.
This decision provides the first judicial clarification of the scope
of the Treasury Secretary's authority under 19 U.S.C. §
160(b)(1)(B). The court's narrow interpretation maximizes the
deterrent effect of the United States antidumping laws by making
it clear that even importations that merely threaten injury will be
subject to potential retroactive assessment of dumping duties. The
broader significance of the instant opinion is twofold. First, it evidences the court's reluctance to accept new interpretations of the
language of the Antidumping Act designed to give effect to the
International Anti-Dumping Code without violating the terms of
the Renegotiation Amendments Act. The court dismissed the Government's suggested interpretation without mention of City Lumber Co. v. United States, 34 which provided support for the Government's conclusions regarding the meaning of likelihood determinations. Furthermore, in construing the statutory language, the court
relied upon the Treasury Department's previous practice as a
guide to the proper interpretation. This approach made it unlikey
that the Treasury Department would be able to convince the court
that its previous practice reflected a faulty interpretation of the
statutory language. Secondly, this decision may have international
ramifications. The success of the International Anti-Dumping
Code depends upon the ability of the Treasury Department to
satisfy the United States courts that the Code is not controlling
domestic antidumping procedures and to convince the other contracting parties that the Code is being fully enforced. 5 The other
seventeen signatories to the Code have already implemented its
34. 457 F.2d at 991.

35. Shannon & Marx, supra note 23, at 202.
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provisions. They will view this decision as further evidence of the
failure of the United States to do so and consequently may repudiate the Code." Repudiation might be accompanied by the retaliatory application of foreign antidumping laws against United
States companies." The instant decision has cut off what appeared
to be the most promising method for implementing the Code;
namely, a liberal interpretation of the Antidumping Act consistent
with the Code. If this decision remains, and unless the Congress
passes implementing legislation," there is little chance that article
11 or any other Code provision judged inconsistent with the Antidumping Act will be given effect in the United States.
Alexander A. Hassani
36. The strongest evidence that the United States does not intend to implement the Code is the passage of the Renegotiation Amendments Act of 1968. See
note 27 supra.
37. Barcelo, supra note 12, at 560.
38. Although there might be speculation that the changes in the U.S. antidumping laws effected by the Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978
(1975), were designed to conform U.S. law to the provisions of the International
Anti-Dumping Code, it is quite doubtful that the changes were so motivated or
that they even succeeded in achieving such conformity. McDermid & Foster, The
U.S. InternationalTrade Commission's 30-Day Inquiry Under the Antidumping
Act: Section 210(c)(2), 27 MERCER L. Rav. 657, 661 (1976).

INTERNATIONAL BANKING-BANKRUPTCY-FOREIGN BANKS
NEITHER REGULATED BY NOR LICENSED To Do BUSINESS IN THE UNITED
STATES MAY FILE FOR VOLUNTARY BANKRUPTCY UNDER THE NATIONAL

BANKRUPTCY ACT

Israel-British Bank (London) Ltd.' (IBB), a bank organized
under the laws of the United Kingdom, was not licensed to do
banking business in the United States under either state or federal
law.2 Although it did not engage in banking in the United States,
IBB maintained deposits in and borrowed from various United

States banks, including Franklin National Bank 3 (Franklin) and
Bank of the Commonwealth (Commonwealth). In July 1974, having already defaulted on a loan from Franklin,4 IBB failed to make
payment on a loan from Commonwealth.' Commonwealth instituted an action to recover its loan and obtained an order of attachment, which, after service on United States banks holding IBB
deposits, resulted in a default judgment against IBB. Subsequently, Franklin also initiated an action to attach IBB deposits.

In the meantime, IBB became insolvent and filed for voluntary
liquidation proceedings in the United Kingdom.6 The High Court
of England, which had jurisdiction over the proceedings, appointed
a receiver to wind up IBB's affairs in the United States. 7 In Sep1. Israel-British Bank (London) Ltd. became insolvent shortly after its affiliate, the Israel-British Bank, Ltd., of Tel Aviv failed and could not pay its debts
to the London bank.
2. Only Alaska, California, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, New York, Massachusetts, Missouri, Oregon, and Washington license branches or agencies of foreign
banks. In each case, the foreign banks are supervised by state bank authorities.
See generally, Lichtenstein, ForeignParticipationin United States Banking: Regulatory Myths and Realities, 15 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. Rv. 879 (1974); Halperin,
The Regulation of Foreign Banks in the United States, 9 INT'L LAw. 661 (1975).
3. Franklin National Bank was itself being liquidated at the time this suit was
brought. Its successor in interest was the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
This comment, however, will refer to Franklin National Bank as the party in
interest.
4. The principal and interest on the loan amounted to approximately
$2,100,000.
5. Commonwealth's loan to IBB was substantially less than Franklin's,
amounting to approximately $500,000.
6. When it was unable to pay its debts, IBB instituted voluntary liquidation
proceedings pursuant to section 222 of the English Companies Act, 1948, 11 & 12
Geo. 6, c.38, in the High Court, Chancery Division, of the United Kingdom.
7. On August 6, 1974, a receiving order was issued by the High Court constituting Arthur Thomas Check as Receiver and Provisional Liquidator of IBB's
assets. The Receiver filed the voluntary bankruptcy petition considered in this
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tember 1974, before Franklin could obtain a judgment and before
Commonwealth could compel payment, the Receiver filed a voluntary straight bankruptcy petition, pursuant to section 2 of the
National Bankruptcy Act,' which entitles a foreign corporation
with assets in the United States to file a voluntary petition in
bankruptcy. IBB was adjudicated a bankrupt the same day.
Franklin and Commonwealth filed motions to vacate the adjudication and to dismiss the voluntary petition in an attempt to remove
the limitation placed upon the enforcement of their prior liens by
section 67(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Act, which gives the trustee in
bankruptcy the power to avoid all liens acquired within four
months of the filing of a bankruptcy petition.2 Franklin and Commonwealth argued that section 4 of the Bankruptcy Act 0 excludes
case because the High Court had no extraterritorial jurisdiction over United
States assets.
8. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, as amended by Chandler
Act of 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840, 11 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1970) [hereinafter cited
as Bankruptcy Act]. Bankruptcy Act § 2, 11 U.S.C. § 11(a)(1) states:
(a) The courts of the United States hereinbefore defined as courts of bankruptcy are created courts of bankruptcy and are invested, within their respective territorial limits as now established or as they may be hereafter
changed, with such jurisdiction at law and in equity as will enable them to
exercise original jurisdiction in proceedings under this title, in vacation, in
chambers, and during their respective terms, as they are now or may be
hereafter held, to
(1) Adjudge persons bankrupt who have had their principal place of
business, resided, or had their domicile within their respective territorial
jurisdictions for the preceding six months, or for a longer portion of the
preceding six months than in any other jurisdiction, or who do not have
their principal place of business, reside, or have their domicile within the
United States, but have property within their jurisdiction, or in any cases
transferred to them pursuant to this title.
9. Both Franklin's and Commonwealth's liens on IBB assets in other United
States banks were obtained by order of attachment within four months of the
filing of IBB's voluntary petition in bankruptcy. Section 67(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 107 (1970), provides that, if there is jurisdiction to sustain
the American adjudication in bankruptcy, the American trustee will be in a
position to bring a proceeding for avoidance of all liens obtained within four
months of the filing of the voluntary petition in bankruptcy as long as the bankrupt was insolvent at the time of filing.
10. Bankruptcy Act, § 4, 11 U.S.C. § 22 (1970) states in relevant part:
[Who May Become Bankrupts] (a) Any person, except a municipal, railroad, insurance, or banking corporation, or a building and loan association,
shall be entitled to the benefits of this title as a voluntary bankrupt.
(b) Any natural person, except a wage earner or farmer, any moneyed,
business, or commercial corporation, except a building and loan association, a municipal, railroad, insurance, or banking corporation, owing debts
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IBB as a "banking corporation" from the provisions of the Act,
thereby depriving the bankruptcy court of subject matter jurisdiction." Reflecting the concern of an order from the High Court of
England authorizing the Receiver to insure that IBB's assets became available for the benefit of creditors in general, the bankruptcy judge held that IBB was not a "banking corporation"
within the meaning of section 4 of the Bankruptcy Act. On appeal,
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York reversed, ruling that the statutory words "banking corporation" must be literally construed to include all foreign banks
whether or not they are regulated by state or federal banking
laws.' 2 On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, held, reversed. When a foreign bank has assets in
United States banks but is neither licensed to do banking business
in the United States nor regulated by state or federal banking laws,
it is excluded from the "banking corporation" exception of section
4 of the Bankruptcy Act and is entitled to file a voluntary petition
in bankruptcy. Israel-BritishBank (London) Ltd. v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,536 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1976).
The Constitution empowers Congress to establish "uniform laws
on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States."' 13
With reference to this provision, the Supreme Court has ruled that
the states are without power to enforce any law governing bankruptcies that conflicts with congressional action in this area.'4 The
states may enact insolvency laws, however, provided their sphere
of regulation does not infringe on Congress' constitutionally delegated authority in Article I section 8.'1 Pursuant to its constitutional authority, Congress enacted the National Bankruptcy Act 6
(Act) to redress the inconsistencies present in creditors' rights
to the amount of $1000 or over, may be adjudged an involuntary bankrupt
upon default or an impartial trial and shall be subject to the provisions and
entitled to the benefits of this title ....
11. Franklin and Commonwealth argued that "banking corporation" included
all banks, regardless of whether they were foreign or domestic or whether they
were licensed in the United States, thereby including IBB within the § 4 exception.
12. In re Israel-British Bank (London) Ltd., 401 F. Supp. 1159 (S.D.N.Y.
1975).
13. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
14. International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261, 264 (1929); In re Watts
and Sachs, 190 U.S. 1, 27 (1903).
15. Butler v. Goreley, 146 U.S. 303 (1892); Tua v. Carrierre, 117 U.S. 201
(1886).
16. 11 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1970).

166

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[Vol. 10.:163

under state insolvency laws.' 7 While the Act primarily sought to
promote equal distribution of a debtor's assets, it also sought to
improve the administration of bankruptcy liquidations, establish
a uniform system of bankruptcy proceedings, and provide the
bankruptcy court' 8 with sufficient discretion to arrive at the most
equitable solution in any given case. 9 Thus the Act sought to diminish the emphasis placed by state insolvency laws on notice to
creditors, early perfection of liens, and lien priorities.2 Although
the Act encompasses a wide range of debtors in order to accomplish
these objectives, it specifically stipulates in section 4 that
"banking corporations" may not be subjects of voluntary or involuntary bankruptcy proceedings. 2' In excluding "banking corporations," Congress decided that the complexity of the banking system required the more sophisticated regulation and liquidation of
insolvent banks provided by the state or federal banking statutes
that created or licensed them.22 When an insolvent foreign bank is
not licensed or regulated by a state or federal banking statute,
however, the congressional rationale behind the section 4 "banking
corporation" exception is inapplicable,2 leaving it unclear whether
such foreign banks were to be included in the provisions of the
Bankruptcy Act. Because section 2 of the Act entitles a foreign
corporation with assets in the United States to file a voluntary
petition 21 in bankruptcy upon becoming insolvent, an unregulated
17. COLLIER ON BANKRuPTcy 0.01, at 2 (14th ed. 1975). For a general discussion of the philosophy behind bankruptcy, see Shuchman, An Attempt at a
"Philosophy of Bankruptcy", 21 U.C.L.A. L. Rv. 403 (1973).
18. Although in some cases a Master is appointed to rule on federal bankruptcy matters, the federal district court is usually established as the bankruptcy
court. 1 COLLIER BANKRupTcy

MANUAL

2.00, at 2-2 (2d ed. 1976).

19. For a good discussion of the district court's decision in the instant case as
it affects the rights of United States banks and creditors, see Howard, United
States Bankruptcy JurisdictionOver UnregulatedForeignBanks, 17 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 359 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Howard]. The article also outlines the advantages and disadvantages of the bankruptcy system and state insolvency proceedings.
20. Id. at 379.
21. 11 U.S.C. § 22 (1970). See note 10 supra.
22. See In re Union Guarantee & Morgage Co., 75 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 296 U.S. 594 (1935); Woolsey v. Security Trust Co., 74 F.2d 334 (5th Cir.
1934). These cases not only point up Congress' intention that state and federal
banking laws should regulate the liquidation of all licensed banks but also that
Congress specifically intended to divide this regulatory power between state and
federal law.
23. Howard, supra note 19, at 661.
24. The language of § 2 provides that any "person" with property within the
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foreign25 bank so situated may be excluded from the provisions of
the Act only if the bank is held to fall within the section 4 "banking
corporations" exception. 21 Unfortunately, section 4 does not define
what constitutes a "banking corporation." Furthermore, prior judicial definitions of a "banking corporation" as "corporations
which were authorized by the laws of their creation to do a banking
business" may be inapposite because the cases so holding have
never involved an unregulated foreign bank. Nor does the background of section 4 and its predecessors define the "banking corporation" exception. The original exception provision in section 4(b)
of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act provided that "private bankers, but
not national banks or banks incorporated under State or Territorial laws, may be adjudged involuntary bankrupts. ' 2 The legislative history of this provision indicates that it was concerned with
the division of power between state and federal banking authorities
on the regulation and liquidation of domestic banks. 29 Exactly
jurisdiction of the United States is subject to the provisions of the Bankruptcy
Act. The Act defines "persons" to include "corporations", so any corporation,
foreign or domestic, with property assets in the United States would be subject
to the provisions of the Act, unless excluded under § 4. 11 U.S.C. § 1(23) (1970).
25. The term unregulated foreign bank will be used to denote those foreign
banks that are not licensed to do banking business in the United States or regulated by state or federal banking statutes.
26. The major emphasis in this comment is placed on interpretation of the
"banking corporation" exception in § 4 as it affects the subject matter jurisdiction
of the bankruptcy court over voluntary petitions in bankruptcy. The jurisdictional issue carries over into other sections of the Bankruptcy Act, however,
notably involuntary petitions in bankruptcy and ch. X petitions for reorganization. In In re Bankhaus I.D. HerstaatKGa A. i l., No. 74B 1134 (R.B.) (S.D.N.Y.
1974), a case involving the determination of the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction
over an unregulated foreign bank under an involuntary bankruptcy petition, the
parties settled out of court before the court could decide the issue. In In reBanque
de Financement, S.A., No. 75 B 764 (R.B.) (S.D.N.Y. 1975), however, the issue
of the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction in a ch. X petition for reorganization by an
unregulated foreign bank has not been resolved and will likely be affected by the
decision in the instant case.
27. Gamble v. Daniel, 39 F.2d 447, 450 (8th Cir.) appeal dismissed, 281 U.S.
705 (1930) (holding that the receipt of deposits for use in the banking business
was essential to the classification of a "banking corporation" under § 4 of the
Bankruptcy Act).
28. Section 4(b) of the 1898 Act dealt only with involuntary bankruptcies. The
provision excluding such banks was carried over to voluntary bankruptcies as well
when the 1910 Amendment changed the exclusion to "banking corporations." See
Act of June 25, 1910, § 4, 36 Stat. 838, 839.
29. 30 CONG. REc. 602, 606 (1897); H.R. Rep. No. 65, 55th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1897). For a general view of the Bankruptcy Act and its legislative history, see
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which banks were to be excluded under the 1898 Act, however, was
not further defined in the legislative history. When it replaced the
language of section 4(b) of the 1898 Act with the words "banking
corporations" in the 1910 Amendment to the Bankruptcy Act,
Congress intended to provide a more comprehensive definition of
the excluded corporations in section 4. This definition is limited
by the fact that Congress never contemplated the existence of
foreign banks in the United States when section 4 was drafted. 0
Since the legislative history of section 4 does not define the term
"banking corporation", the policy considerations that prompted
the exclusion in section 4 become relevant in determining Congress' intent. The major policy considerations behind section 4
were the desirability of unarrested banking operations, protection
of the banking industry's image, and the inappropriateness of the
bankruptcy machinery in the affairs of banking corporations.'
Since these policies should be equally applicable to each institution that is to be included within the "banking corporation" exception, they may indicate which banks Congress intended to exclude
in section 4. Nevertheless, because of the failure of section 4 and
its legislative history to define the "banking corporation" exception, the task of applying these policies and determining whether
an unregulated foreign bank falls within the exception has been
left to the courts.
At the first appellate level, the district court reversed the bankruptcy judge's ruling that a foreign bank not licensed to do business in the United States was not included in the section 4
"banking corporation" exception.2 The court rejected IBB's argument that because it was not regulated by state or federal banking
statutes it was not even a "bank" as such within the United States
and therefore did not fall within the "banking corporation" exception. The court noted that since IBB was authorized under the laws
of the United Kingdom to conduct a banking business and since
"banking corporations" has been construed to include "corporations which were authorized by the laws of their creation
Sovern, Section 4 of the Bankruptcy Act: The Excluded Corporations,42 MINN.
L. REv. 171 (1957).
30. H.R. 511, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. (1910). H.R. 18694, 60th Cong., 2d Sess.

(1909).
31. H.R. 18694, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1909). See also In re Supreme Lodge of

the Mason's Annuity, 286 F. 180, 184 (1923) (in which the court enumerated the
purposes for enacting the "banking corporation" exception).

32. 401 F. Supp. at 1159.
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to do a banking business,

'13

IBB was a qualified "banking corpora-

tion" under the plain meaning of the term. The court nevertheless
reviewed the legislative history and underlying purposes of section
4 in order to support its adoption of the exception's plain meaning.34 The court reasoned that although Congress had not contemplated the existence of foreign banks in the United States when the
section 4 exception was drafted, the 1910 Amendment was designed to produce a new comprehensive definition that included all
"banking corporations," regardless of their place of incorporation
or charter. Ultimately, the court concluded that since the legislative history of both the 1898 Act and the 1910 Amendment was
ambiguous and non-determinative, 5 the adoption of the plain
meaning of "banking corporations" could be defined. Next the
court rejected IBB's contention that the section 4 exception should
be interpreted with reference to the general objective of the Bankruptcy Act to equalize the distribution of assets rather than to the
underlying purposes of the section 4 exception. The court cited
these purposes to support its conclusions, noting that they apply
equally to unregulated foreign banks and domestic banks.3 The
court stated that the purpose of subjecting banks to more effective
state or federal banking statutes could be satisfied in the case of
unregulated foreign banks by regulation under foreign liquidation
laws. 7 The court then pointed out that the purpose of protecting
33. Although the case of Gamble v. Daniel, supra note 27, does define
"banking corporation" in this manner, its holding is limited to the determination
of which United States institutions doing some banking business should fall into
the "banking corporations" exception. Therefore, it cannot stand for a definition
of "banking corporation" as regards unregulated foreign banks. In support of its
position, however, the court further pointed out that § 1(23) of the Bankruptcy
Act defined the word "person" to include corporations and that § 1(8) of the Act
defines "corporations" as "all bodies having any of the powers and privileges of
private corporations not possessed by individuals ... ." 11 U.S.C. § 1(8) (1970).
The court then considered the "banking corporation" exception of § 4, read together with § 1 (23) and § 1(8). 401 F. Supp. 1162-63.
34. The court also cited a number of cases holding that courts have been
willing to consider the legislative history of a statute if such history sheds light
on even superficially "clear" statutory language. Although the district court decided that the language of § 4 was clear, it maintained that a review of its
legislative history would be helpful. Id. at 1163.
35. Id. at 1169.
36. The court enumerated the policies set out in the text accompanying note
31 supra. 401 F. Supp. at 1173.
37. After careful review of the legislative history of § 4, the court concluded
that it had not been definitively established that the "banking corporation" exception was promulgated because of the existence of extensive regulatory banking
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public faith in the banking system demanded the inclusion of unregulated foreign banks as well as all regulated banks. The court
further noted that the remaining purposes of the "banking corporation" exception, to insure the continuity of the banking system
and to avoid the application of the inappropriate bankruptcy system to bank insolvencies, were applicable to insolvencies of unregulated foreign banks.18 Finally, the court justified its holding by
stating that the words of a statute must be given effect as they
read, unless that interpretation frustrates the purpose of the legislation or is contrary to legislative intent, neither of which occur in
this case.
On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the district court's decision. 9 The instant court first pointed out that IBB would come
within the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act under section 2 as a
foreign corporation with assets in the United States. The court
then noted that since Congress had never considered the question
of the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction over unregulated foreign
banks, there could be no clear meaning that included such banks
within the section 4 exception." The court emphasized instead the
necessity of referring to rules of statutory construction and the
legislative history of section 4 in interpreting the meaning of the
term "banking corporations". The court stated that whereas words
creating a general inclusionary category may warrant a liberal interpretation, normal rules of construction require that words of an
exception be strictly construed to limit the exception.41 The court
laws. Nevertheless, the court noted that had this been the primary purpose of
Congress, foreign banks could be just as easily regulated by foreign liquidation
laws, leaving the liquidation of the foreign banks' United States assets to local
laws such as the N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1202(a)(4) (McKinney), which provides
that a receiver may be appointed to preserve the assets of a foreign corporation
for distribution to the corporation's creditors. 401 F. Supp. at 1172-73.
38. 401 F. Supp. at 1174.
39. 536 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1976).
40. The court cited as evidence for the position that there is no plain meaning
in "banking corporation" the case of McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25
(1931), where Justice Holmes found that an airplane was not a "motor vehicle"
though it was propelled by a motor. The instant court noted that in both these
cases the items to be considered within these exceptions, respectively an unregulated foreign bank and an airplane, had not been considered when the exception
was formulated.
41. The court cited numerous cases in support of this principle, most notably,
Piedmont & N. Ry. v. ICC, 286 U.S. 299 (1932) (holding that an electric railway
company did not fall within the pvrposes of § 22 of the remedial Transportation
Act).
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noted the appropriateness of this rule where the underlying purpose of the exception did not apply to the situation purported to
fit into the exception.12 Thus, a foreign bank not licensed to do
banking business in the United States should not be included in
an exception whose primary purpose was to subject banks to the
insolvency regulations of the state or federal banking statutes that
created them. The court further found it more logical to include
unregulated foreign banks within the Bankruptcy Act since its
general remedial purpose could be appropriately applied to them.
In support of this conclusion, the instant court also cited the legislative history of the "banking corporation" exception. The court
reasoned that had Congress contemplated the situation of an unregulated foreign bank when it drafted section 4 in the 1910
Amendment, such banks would have been excluded from the exception for the same reason private bankers were excluded from
section 4(b) of the 1898 Act. 3 The court concluded that since the
legislative history of the 1910 Amendment indicated Congress did
not intend to change the law under section 4,44 the "banking corporations" exception merely excluded the same licensed state, national, or territorial banks that had been excluded from the 1898
Act. Finally, the court noted that applying the "banking corporation" exception to IBB would impair the effectiveness of the Bankruptcy Act and the banking system by forcing it into liquidation
proceedings under state insolvency laws. 5 For these reasons, the
instant court held it would be more logical and reasonable to exclude unregulated foreign banks from the section 4 exception and
therefore allow them to file voluntary bankruptcy petitions.
Since the statutory interpretations of the "banking corporation"
exception by both the district court and the court of appeals have
their respective merits, it would be inappropriate to discuss their
42. The court compared the situation of an unregulated foreign bank to the
underlying purpose of the § 4 "banking corporation" exception, stating that the
existence of alternative foreign regulatory banking laws was largely irrelevant to
the § 4 purpose.
43. 536 F.2d at 513.
44. As authority for this, the court cited the Hearing before Subcommittee
No. 1 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, set out in note 30 supra. Although
sections of this hearing strongly suggest the intention of Congress not to change
the law in substituting "banking corporations" for the words of exception in § 4(b)
of the 1898 Act, it should be noted that this is merely evidence from the record
of a subcommittee hearing and therefore hardly conclusive.
45. 536 F.2d at 515.
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differences any further. The proper area of focus lies rather in the
common ground of the two decisions. Both courts emphasized the
point that Congress had not contemplated the existence of foreign
banks when the section 4 exception was formulated. This fact,
together with the concededly ambiguous nature of section 4's legislative history, indicates that Congress did not specifically intend
to include unregulated foreign banks within the section 4 exception. Thus, in order to determine whether such banks ought to be
included within the exception, it becomes necessary to go beyond
the words of section 4 and its underlying policies to consider the
practical effects of excluding an unregulated foreign bank from the
jurisdiction of the federal bankruptcy court." First, excluding IBB
from the provisions of the Act would not accomplish the purpose
of the section 4 exception, for IBB as an unregulated foreign bank
is not subject to state or federal banking statutes. On the other
hand, excluding an unregulated foreign bank from the jurisdiction
of the federal bankruptcy court and thereby forcing the bank into
state insolvency proceedings would have a major effect on international debtor-creditor relationships. Since most foreign jurisdictions deal with foreign creditors of domestic bankrupts on a reciprocal basis, treatment of unregulated foreign banks in the United
States will have an impact on the way United States creditors are
treated abroad. 4 Thus, if the United States were to guarantee the
protection of a foreign bank's local assets for the benefit of both
foreign and local creditors, the beneficiary foreign jurisdictions
would be more likely to do the same for United States creditors and
their insolvents. As the court of appeals properly points out, the
federal bankruptcy system affords a more effective process for protection of a foreign creditor's rights than do state insolvency laws,
for several reasons. Under state laws, liens that are perfected first
invariably enjoy priority in a liquidation proceeding.48 If an unregulated foreign bank's assets are inadequate to cover all the
46. There is no reason why the characterization of IBB as an institution authorized to do banking business in a foreign country should affect EBB's functional
role as an insolvent in the United States. EBB instituted its voluntary bankruptcy
petition under section 2 of the Act as a foreign corporation, making its status as

a banking institution in a foreign country irrelevant.
47. The bankruptcy laws of Mexico, for example, require that creditors of
local branches of foreign enterprises be paid first if there is a concurrent foreign
bankruptcy proceeding. The bankruptcy laws in other countries, such as Uruguay, Paraguay, Peru, Argentina, and Germany, effectively discriminate simi-

larly in favor of the local creditor.
48. See Howard, supra note 19, at 369.
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claims against them, those creditors who do not perfect their liens
first may receive nothing. This puts foreign creditors at a disadvantage, since local creditors49 are usually the first to receive notice
of the debtor's financial embarrassment and have easier access to
the local courts where their liens can be swiftly perfected. Furthermore, state courts generally prefer local creditors' claims arising
under state law to the claims of foreign creditors arising under
foreign law,50 so that even if foreign creditors' claims were perfected
first in their own jurisdiction, the local creditor might be paid
first.51 Secondly, the inability of state courts to adjust the order of

liens except in the cases of specific defenses such as fraud may
contribute to increased discrimination against United States
banks and creditors in foreign jurisdictions.52 For example, foreign
creditors who are not treated equitably under state laws may put
pressure on foreign jurisdictions to subordinate the claims of
United States creditors. Furthermore, in order to be effectively
applied toward foreign jurisdictions, a more flexible lien adjustment system would have to be uniformly adopted by all the states.
On the other hand, the federal bankruptcy system is uniform and
does not have the same rigid lien priorities that would lead to the
unequal distribution of an unregulated foreign bank's assets. Thus
both local and foreign creditors are given ample opportunity to
protect their rights to the bank's assets. More importantly, the
federal bankruptcy system has more discretion to adjust its proceedings or to decline jurisdiction in order to arrive at the most
equitable solution in a particular case.13 By exercising its discretion
49. The term "local creditor" refers only to United States citizens, although
strictly according to Art. IV § 2 of the United States Constitution it could include
certain aliens. Id.
50. Id. at 370.
51. Id. at 379.
52. Since state courts cannot adjust the order of liens, they cannot favor local
creditors in order to put pressure on foreign creditors with prior liens whose jurisdictions discriminate in favor of local creditors to the disadvantage of United
States creditors. It is admittedly not often the case, however, that foreign creditors are able to establish liens prior to those of local creditors. For a discussion
on the discrimination of foreign bankruptcy laws and how it may effect treatment
of foreign creditors in the United States, see Nadelman, Discriminationin Foreign
Bankruptcy Laws Against Non-Domestic Claims, 47 REF. J. 147 (1973).
53. Bankruptcy courts are courts of equity, provided with considerable discretionary powers by section 2 of the Bankruptcy Act to disallow or subordinate
claims in light of equitable considerations. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1931).
See also Annot., 100 ALR 660 (1936). Furthermore, the bankruptcy court may
reject or accept jurisdiction according to how foreign creditors are treated under
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to reject or accept jurisdiction over a bankrupt according to how
an unregulated foreign bank and its creditors may be treated under
state laws, the bankruptcy court may still protect local creditors
that have perfected liens against the bank's assets in state courts,
protect foreign creditors who have had a chance to acquire a lien
in state court, or favor local creditors in order to put pressure on
particular foreign jurisdictions that discriminate against United
States creditors. Similarly, the court may use its power to adjust
dividends and void preferential liens to the advantage or disadvantage of foreign banks and their creditors. 4 Finally, the federal
bankruptcy system is better equipped to protect the banking system through orderly liquidation of an unregulated foreign bank's
assets, thereby avoiding the instability and lack of confidence in
foreign banks that might be promoted under state insolvency proceedings. Through section 67(a), providing for avoidance of liens
acquired within four months of the filing of a bankruptcy petition,
the Bankruptcy Act minimizes the pressure to anticipate insolvency that is often present under state laws. This reduces the
possible instability in the banking system that might result from
premature or unnecessary liquidation proceedings. Therefore, although the instant court failed to deal with the practical effects of
exercising bankruptcy jurisdiction over an unregulated foreign
bank, its exclusion of IBB from the "banking corporation" exception nevertheless occasioned a beneficial result. The advantages to
be derived from protecting unregulated foreign banks and foreign
creditors, stabilizing the international banking system, and promoting the rights of United States banks and creditors in foreign
jurisdictions far outweigh the gain realized by local creditors with
prior liens, that would result from forcing IBB into the alternate
route of state insolvency proceedings.
Peter Appleton Schuller
state laws. Thus, if foreign courts do not discriminate against United States banks
and creditors, then the bankruptcy court may reciprocate by accepting jurisdiction in a case where foreign creditors would otherwise be disadvantaged under
state laws. Howard, supra note 19, at 383.
54. For an example, the court can, under section 65(d) of the Act, withhold
dividends from foreign creditors where in a reciprocal case in a foreign jurisdic-

tion a United States creditor failed to receive its proper dividends.

